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Clayton Bangsund*  A Survey and Critique of the “Seller in
 Possession” Statutory Regimes of
 Common Law Canada:  An ABC Prequel
The article examines the various provincial and territorial statutory regimes that 
apply to resolve title disputes emanating from a “seller in possession” scenario 
in which an initial buyer leaves bought goods in the possession of a seller 
who then transfers them to a subsequent bona ? de purchaser. Presently there 
are four distinct statutory models in force across common law Canada. Some 
provinces and territories incorporate modernized electronic personal property 
registry infrastructure into their statutory priority regimes, while others do not. 
The author undertakes a comparative assessment of the four models, highlights 
their strengths and weaknesses, and asserts that Model 2—representative of the 
statutory regimes of Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut 
and Saskatchewan—most appropriately de? nes the initial buyer’s risk exposure 
while offering reasonable registration facilities for the protection of his or her non-
possessory ownership interest.
L’article examine les divers régimes législatifs provinciaux et territoriaux qui 
s’appliquent au règlement des différends relatifs au titre de propriété découlant 
d’un scénario où un acheteur initial laisse les biens achetés en la possession 
d’un vendeur qui les transfère ensuite à un acheteur de bonne foi subséquent. 
À l’heure actuelle, quatre modèles législatifs distincts sont en vigueur dans 
l’ensemble du Canada sous le régime de la common law. Certaines provinces et 
certains territoires intègrent l’infrastructure modernisée du registre électronique 
des biens personnels dans leurs régimes de priorité prévus par la loi, tandis 
que d’autres ne le font pas. L’auteur entreprend une évaluation comparative 
des quatre modèles, souligne leurs forces et leurs faiblesses et af? rme que le 
modèle no 2—représentatif des régimes législatifs de l’Alberta, de la Colombie-
Britannique, des Territoires du Nord-Ouest, du Nunavut et de la Saskatchewan 
—dé? nit le mieux l’exposition initiale de l’acheteur au risque tout en offrant des 
mesures d’enregistrement raisonnables pour protéger son titre de participation 
sans possession.
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Introduction
I. Description
1. Nemo Dat: A Common Starting Point
2. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat: More Common 
Ground
a. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
3. Resurrection of Nemo Dat: Divergence
a. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, 
Nunavut, Saskatchewan
4. Statutory Bifurcation: More Diversity
a. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova 
Scotia
b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
c. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat
5. Hybrid Model: Yet More Variety
a. Model 4—Prince Edward Island
b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
c. Resurrection of Nemo Dat
6. Recap
II. Analysis 
1. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
2. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, 
Nunavut, Saskatchewan
3. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova 
Scotia
4.? Model 4—Prince Edward Island
Conclusion
It is not worth while to try to keep history from repeating itself, for man’s character will 
always make the preventing of the repetitions impossible.
—Mark Twain, In Eruption1
Introduction
I wrote about ABCD remoteness problems in my last paper2 so this one, 
addressing mere ABC problems, constitutes a prequel of sorts. Suppose 
that A sells goods to B, but A retains possession of those goods and, 
1. Mark Twain, In Eruption (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1922) at 66.
2. Clayton Bangsund, “ABCD Remoteness Problems: Nemo Dat & Its Exceptions Under 
Subsection 26(1.2) of Saskatchewan’s The Sale of Goods Act” (2018) 81:2 Sask L Rev 133. 
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without authorization, resells them to C. A dispute between B and C erupts 
since, in Bridge’s words, “rogue [A] invariably disappears or turns out to 
be not worth suing, taking with him the purchase price. So the question 
normally resolves itself into an inquiry that has inspired countless judicial 
cris de couer, namely, which of two innocent persons, the owner [B] or 
the purchaser [C], should suffer the consequences of the rogue’s [A’s] 
dishonesty.”3 My object, in this paper, is to survey and critique the various 
statutory regimes of common law Canada that apply to resolve this kind 
of title dispute. Presently there are four distinct statutory models in effect 
among the twelve common law jurisdictions: 
?? Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
?? Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
Saskatchewan
?? Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
?? Model 4—Prince Edward Island
As a general matter, statutory uniformity is both an aim and the norm 
in Canadian sale of goods law.4 Governance of the “seller in possession” 
ABC problem presents a rare and interesting exception. In Canada, 
depending on where these events unfold, the dispute between B and C is 
resolved quite differently according to unique criteria set out in a variety 
of statutes. Some provinces and territories resolve the matter through 
statutory priority rules that hinge on fact and time of registration in the 
personal property registry, while others do not. 
In Part II of this paper, using an incremental approach, I describe the 
basic features of each of the four models using the legislative regimes of 
Ontario, Alberta, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island as proxies for 
Models 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively.5 In Part III I undertake a comparative 
assessment of the models, highlighting their relative strengths and 
weaknesses. In Part IV I offer some closing remarks.  
I. Description 
1. Nemo Dat: A Common Starting Point
The starting point, across all jurisdictions and under each statutory model, 
is nemo dat quod non habet—“one cannot give what one does not have.” 
With reference to the ABC problem, B prevails over C according to a strict 
application of nemo dat because, after transferring title to B, A no longer 
3. MG Bridge, Sale of Goods (Toronto: Butterworths, 1988) at 571 (bracketed text added).
4. Roderick J Wood, “Codi? cation of Commercial Law” (2016) 79:2 Sask L Rev 179. 
5. Details of concordance are furnished in the footnotes. Where appropriate, one of the four model 
proxies also serves as a pan-Canadian proxy.
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has any title to transmit to C. Serving as a pan-Canadian proxy, section 24 
of Nova Scotia’s Sale of Goods Act6 is reproduced below.  
NSSGA, section 24: Subject to this Act, where goods are sold by a person 
who is not the owner thereof and who does not sell them under the 
authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better 
title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by 
his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.7
Bridge notes that “[a] legal system concerned with the protection of 
private property, and not open to any countervailing interests, would assert 
with unabated vigour the maxim nemo dat quod non habet, by which the 
transferee’s [C’s] title could never exceed the title of the transferor [A] and 
would always be vulnerable to the claim of another whose title is superior 
[B].”8 We do not live in such a system. As suggested in the provision’s 
opening words—“[s]ubject to this Act, …”—Canadian legislators have 
seen ? t to recognize various statutory exceptions to nemo dat.9 
2. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat: More Common 
Ground
Ontario’s OSGA s. 25(1), reproduced below, serves as the pan-Canadian 
proxy for the statutory exception to nemo dat potentially available to C in 
our “seller in possession” ABC scenario. Every Canadian common law 
jurisdiction has in force at least one substantive concordant to OSGA s. 
25(1), while ? ve such jurisdictions—Alberta, New Brunswick, Northwest 
Territories, Nunavut and Saskatchewan—have two (one in the Sale of 
Goods Act, the other in the Factors Act).
OSGA, subsection 25(1): Where a person having sold goods continues 
or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title to the goods, 
the delivery or transfer by that person, or by a mercantile agent acting 
for that person, of the goods or documents of title under a sale, pledge or 
other disposition thereof to a person receiving the goods or documents of 
title in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, has the same 
6. Sale of Goods Act, RSNS 1989, c 408 [NSSGA]. 
7. Ibid s 24. See also Alberta—Sale of Goods Act, RSA 2000, c S-2, s 23(1) [ASGA]; British 
Columbia—Sale of Goods Act, RSBC 1996, c 410, s 26(1) [BCSGA];  Manitoba—The Sale of Goods 
Act, RSM 1987, c S1, s 23 [MSGA]; New Brunswick—Sale of Goods Act, RSNB 2016, c 110, s 
28 [NBSGA]; Newfoundland & Labrador—Sale of Goods Act, RSNL 1990, c S-6, s 23 [NLSGA]; 
Northwest Territories and Nunavut—Sale of Goods Act, RSNWT 1988, c S-2, s 25(1) [NWTSGA], as 
duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28 [NSGA]; Ontario—Sale of Goods 
Act, RSO 1990, c S.1, s 22 [OSGA]; Prince Edward Island—Sale of Goods Act, RSPEI 1988, c S-1, s 
23 [PEISGA]; Saskatchewan—The Sale of Goods Act, RSS 1978, c S-1, s 23(1) [SSGA]; Yukon—Sale 
of Goods Act, RSY 2002, c 198, s 22(1) [YSGA]. 
8. Bridge, supra note 3 at 570 (bracketed text added). 
9. See GHL Fridman, Sale of Goods in Canada, 6th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2013) at 107-128. 
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effect as if the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly 
authorized by the owner of the goods to make the delivery or transfer.10 
The provision recognizes an explicit exception to nemo dat where buyer 
B leaves goods (or documents of title11) in the possession of seller A 
who subsequently sells, pledges or otherwise disposes of them to buyer 
C, an acquirer in good faith without notice of B’s interest.12 Although A 
no longer owns the goods, the subsection enables her to convey title as 
if B had expressly authorized her to do so. Accordingly, C can rely on 
A’s possession of the goods as suf? cient proof of her ownership and/or 
authority to sell. Subsection 25(1) of the OSGA recognizes an exception 
to nemo dat based on a policy of protecting innocent purchasers who 
rely on A’s possession as a badge of authority. The provision operates as 
a defence to B’s action in conversion against C.13 To the extent that it 
operates, C acquires title to the goods thereby defeating B’s interest under 
this statutory exception to nemo dat.14 
I have written elsewhere, in considerable detail, about the history and 
judicial interpretation of this provision.15 I will not reproduce that effort 
10. OSGA, supra note 7, s 25(1). See also Alberta—ASGA, supra note 7, s 26(1); Factors Act, RSA 
2000, c F-1, s 9(1) [Alberta Factors Act]; British Columbia—BCSGA, supra note 7, s 30(1); Manitoba 
—MSGA, supra note 7, s 28(1); New Brunswick—NBSGA, supra note 7, s 31(2) and (4); Factors 
and Agents Act, RSNB 2011, c 153, ss 13(1) and (2) [NB Factors Act]; Newfoundland & Labrador 
—NLSGA, supra note 7, s 27(1); Nova Scotia – NSSGA, supra note 7, s 28(2); Northwest Territories 
—NWTSGA, supra note 7, s 27(2); Factors Act, RSNWT 1988, c F-1, s 8(1) [NWT Factors Act], as 
duplicated for Nunavut by s 29 of the Nunavut Act [Nunavut Factors Act]; Nunavut—NSGA, supra 
note 7, s 27(2); Nunavut Factors Act, s 8(1); Prince Edward Island—Factors Act, RSPEI 1988, c F-1, 
s 9(1) [PEI Factors Act]; Saskatchewan—SSGA, supra note 7, s 26(1); The Factors Act, RSS 1978, 
c F-1, s 9(1) [Saskatchewan Factors Act]; Yukon—YSGA, supra note 7, s 24(1). Note the slightly 
broader scope of the various Factors Act provisions in comparison with their Sale of Goods Act 
counterparts. British Columbia’s BCSGA presents an exception in that it adopts the broader language 
typically seen in the Factors Acts: see Bridge, supra note 3 at 634.
11. To avoid unnecessary convolution, this paper focuses on resolution of the dispute described in the 
paper’s opening paragraph, which does not involve goods embodied in a negotiable document of title. 
Where a warehouse receipt is involved, yet another statutory exception to nemo dat may be available 
to C in eight of Canada’s twelve common law jurisdictions: Alberta—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSA 
2000, c W-1, s 28; British Columbia—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSBC 1996, c 481, s 27; Manitoba—
The Warehouse Receipts Act, RSM 1987, c W30, s 28; New Brunswick—Warehouse Receipts Act, 
RSNB 2011, c 236, s 27; Newfoundland & Labrador—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSNL 1990, c W-1, 
s 28;  Nova Scotia—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSNS 1989, c 498, s 28; Ontario—Warehouse Receipts 
Act, RSO 1990, c W3, s 27; Yukon—Warehouse Receipts Act, RSY 2002, c 227, s 27.   
12. Bridge, supra note 3 at 547. 
13. See e.g. Bartin Pipe & Piling Supply Ltd v Epscan Industries Ltd, 2004 ABCA 52 at para 42 
[Bartin Pipe].
14. See Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering Co Ltd, [1971] 3 All ER 708 (CA), 
[1971] 3 WLR 661; National Trust Co v Kirch (1993), 12 OR (3d) 781 (Gen Div), [1993] OJ No 
765; Kosolofsky v Pasta D’Aurum (Canada) Inc, 2000 SKQB 164; Michael Gerson (Leasing) Ltd v 
Wilkinson and another, [2001] QB 514.
15. Bangsund, supra note 2 at 142-146. 
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here, but instead furnish an abbreviated account of the provision’s lineage. 
A version of the provision was originally enacted under the Factors 
Act, 187716 as an expedited statutory response to a controversial pair of 
decisions17 that left the ? nancial industry dissatis? ed with the state of late 
nineteenth century English law.18 The provision was soon broadened and 
restated in England’s consolidated Factors Act, 1889,19 then substantially 
replicated in slightly narrower language under the Sale of Goods Act, 
1893,20 a comprehensive codi? cation of the common law of sales of the 
time.21 All Canadian common law jurisdictions eventually copied the 
English provision.22 At present day, in every jurisdiction in common law 
Canada, at least one version of the Victorian era statutory exception to 
nemo dat—as originally formulated in the Factors Act, 1889 and the Sale 
of Goods Act, 1893—potentially applies to resolve “seller in possession” 
ABC disputes. 
a. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
Under Model 1, the analysis ends with the Victorian era provision as 
enacted in the legislation of the province or territory. Where B leaves 
bought goods in A’s possession in any of Manitoba, Ontario or Yukon, 
the statutory exception to nemo dat applies and C enjoys title to the goods 
free and clear under a subsequent sale provided she acquires possession in 
good faith and without notice of B’s interest. 
16. Factors Act 1877 (UK), 40 & 41 Vict, c 39, s 3 [Factors Act 1877]. 
17. Johnson v The Credit Lyonnais and Johnson v Blumenthal (1877), 3 CPD 32, 37 LT 657 
(CA) aff’g  Johnson v The Credit Lyonnais (1877), 2 CPD 224, 36 LT 253 (CP Div) and Johnson v 
Blumenthal, unreported. 
18. Factors Act 1877, Preamble: “WHEREAS doubts have arisen with respect to the true meaning 
of certain provisions of the Factors’ Acts, and it is expedient to remove such doubts and otherwise 
to amend the said Acts, for the better security of persons buying or making advances on goods, or 
documents of title to goods, in the usual and ordinary course of mercantile business.”
19. Factors Act 1889 (UK), 52 & 53 Vict, c 45. 
20. Sale of Goods Act 1893 (UK), 56 & 57 Vict, c 71. 
21. MD Chalmers, The Sale of Goods, including the Factors Act, 1889, 1st ed (London: William 
Clowes and Sons, 1890) at iv.
22. Royston Miles Goode & Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 4th ed (London: 
Penguin Books, 2010) at 7, 205.
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3. Resurrection of Nemo Dat: Divergence
a. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
Saskatchewan  
Unlike Model 1, Model 2, representing the law of Alberta, British 
Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut and Saskatchewan, offers B 
registration-based protection in the case of a deferred-possession sale 
arrangement. Consider Alberta’s ASGA s. 26(2),23 which serves as proxy 
for Model 2 jurisdictions. 
ASGA, subsection 26(2): Subsection (1) does not apply to a sale, pledge 
or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to goods, other 
than negotiable documents of title to goods, that is out of the ordinary 
course of business of the person having sold the goods where, prior to 
the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner is registered in 
the Personal Property Registry in accordance with the regulations made 
under the Personal Property Security Act, and Part 4 of that Act applies, 
with the necessary modi? cations, to that registration.24 
Subsection 26(2) of the ASGA adopts Part 4 (Registration) of Alberta’s 
Personal Property Security Act25 and Personal Property Security 
Regulation26  thereby enabling B, a buyer out of possession,27 to register 
23. See also Alberta Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2): “Subsection (1) does not apply to a sale, 
pledge or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to goods, other than negotiable documents 
of title to goods, that is out of the ordinary course of business of the person having sold the goods 
where, prior to the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner is registered in the Personal 
Property Registry in accordance with the regulations made under the Personal Property Security Act, 
and Part 4 of that Act applies to that registration.”
24. ASGA, supra note 7, s 26(2). See also Alberta—Alberta Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2); 
British Columbia—BCSGA, supra note 7, s 30(2); Northwest Territories—NWTSGA, supra note 7, s 
27(2.1); NWT Factors Act, supra note 10, s 8(2); Nunavut—NSGA, supra note 10, s 27(2.1); Nunavut 
Factors Act, supra note 10, s 8(2); Saskatchewan—SSGA, supra note 10, s 26(1.1); Saskatchewan 
Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2).
25. Personal Property Security Act, RSA 2000, c P-7. See also Personal Property Security Act, 
RSBC 1996, c 359; Personal Property Security Act, SNWT 1994, c 8, as duplicated for Nunavut by s 
29 of the Nunavut Act, SC 1993, c 28; The Personal Property Security Act, 1993, SS 1993, c P-6.2.
26. Personal Property Security Regulation, Alta Reg 95/2001 [Alberta Regulations]. See also 
Personal Property Security Regulation, BC Reg 227/2002 [BC Regulations]; Personal Property 
Security Regulations, NWT Reg R-066-2001 [NWT Regulations]; Consolidation of Personal Property 
Security Regulations, Nu Reg 007-2001 [Nunavut Regulations]; The Personal Property Security 
Regulations, RRS c P-6.2 Reg 1 [Saskatchewan Regulations].
27. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1)(w)(ii): “‘secured party’ means, with respect to 
registration of forms, where the registration is: …authorized under the Sale of Goods Act or the
Factors Act, a person who, having bought goods, leaves the goods or the documents of title to the 
goods that are the subject of the registration in the possession of the seller,”; See also BC Regulations, 
supra note 26, s 1(1), “secured party”; NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “secured party”; Nunavut 
Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “secured party”; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 2(1)(t)
(ii). 
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notice of his ownership interest in the PPR against A.28 The subsection 
resurrects nemo dat in favour of B, a buyer/owner out of possession, 
provided B registers in timely fashion in accordance with the Alberta 
Regulations by serial number in respect of serial numbered goods29 or by 
item or kind in respect of all goods other than serial numbered goods.30 
Under Model 2, B is unable to prevent A from conferring title to 
C pursuant to an ordinary course sale. Registration offers B attenuated 
protection, serving as a pre-condition to the categorical application of 
nemo dat vis-à-vis C where C is a buyer outside the ordinary course. 
Speci? cally, ASGA s. 26(2) requires that B, the buyer/owner who occupies 
a position analogous to that of a secured party, register notice of his interest 
in the PPR if he wishes to preserve nemo dat and gain optimal protection 
against third parties, like C, who deal with A in good faith outside the 
ordinary course of business.31 B is protected against C provided he 
properly registers notice of his interest in the PPR; the exception to nemo 
dat in ASGA s. 26(1) no longer applies, and B prevails pursuant to the joint 
application of ASGA ss. 23(1) and 26(2). This registration-based system, 
which replaces repealed bills of sale legislation in Model 2 jurisdictions,32
is fully integrated with the PPR’s electronic notice-registration system and 
enables C to discover B’s ownership by conducting a search of A’s name, 
thus justifying an outcome in B’s favour. 
To recap, Model 2 creates an attenuated title notice system under which 
B’s registration in the PPR is a precondition to the categorical invocation 
of nemo dat against subsequent non-ordinary course buyers. The system is 
attenuated in the sense that a valid registration does not protect B against 
28. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1)(j)(ii): “‘debtor’ means, with respect to all registration 
forms, where the registration is: …authorized pursuant to the Sale of Goods Act or the Factors Act, a 
person who, having sold goods, continues or is in possession of the goods or of the documents of title 
to the goods that are the subject of the registration,”; See also BC Regulations, supra note 26, s 1(1), 
“debtor”; NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, “debtor”; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26, s 1, 
“debtor”; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 2(1)(h)(ii).
29. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 30(a): “Where a ? nancing statement is submitted for 
registration, as authorized by the Factors Act or Sale of Goods Act, (a) goods that are serial numbered 
goods must be described in accordance with section 35, and…”; See also BC Regulations, supra note 
26, s 12(1)(a); NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 34; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26, s 34; 
Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 18(1)(a).
30. Alberta Regulations, supra note 26, s 30(b): “Where a ? nancing statement is submitted for 
registration, as authorized by the Factors Act or Sale of Goods Act, …(b) goods other than serial 
numbered goods must be described in accordance with section 36(2)(a).” See also BC Regulations, 
supra note 26, s 12(1)(b); NWT Regulations, supra note 26, s 33; Nunavut Regulations, supra note 26, 
s 33; Saskatchewan Regulations, supra note 26, s 18(1)(b).
31. See E Dehr Delivery Ltd v Dehr, 2016 ABQB 714 at para 42.
32. For more information about bills of sale legislation, see Bangsund, ABCD Remoteness Problems, 
supra note 2 at 147-148. 
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subsequent ordinary course buyers who receive the goods in good faith 
without notice of B’s interest.
4. Statutory Bifurcation: More Diversity
a. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
Under Model 3, representing the law of New Brunswick, Newfoundland 
& Labrador and Nova Scotia (the law of Nova Scotia serves as our Model 
3 proxy), legal analysis of the “seller in possession” ABC problem is more 
complicated. To determine which statutory system applies to resolve the 
dispute, one must ? rst examine the nature of the initial transaction between 
A and B. 
b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
Where the transaction between A and B occurs outside the ordinary course 
of A’s business, it is a “sale of goods without a change of possession” 
within the meaning of Nova Scotia’s Personal Property Security Act.33 
NSPPSA, s. 2(1)(an): “sale of goods without a change of possession” 
means a sale of goods that is not accompanied by an immediate delivery 
and an actual, apparent and continued change of possession of the 
goods sold, but does not include a sale of goods in the ordinary course 
of business of the seller, and for the purpose of this de? nition, “sale” 
includes an assignment, transfer, conveyance, declaration of trust or 
any other agreement or transaction, not intended to secure payment or 
performance of an obligation, by which an interest in goods is conferred;34
Under the NSPPSA, a sale of goods without a change of possession 
creates a deemed security interest35 to which the statute applies.36 This 
means that B, a secured party,37 must effect registration38 to perfect39 her 
33. Personal Property Security Act, SNS 1995-96, c  13 [NSPPSA]. See also New Brunswick 
—Personal Property Security Act, SNB 1993, c P-7.1 [NBPPSA]; Newfoundland & Labrador—
Personal Property Security Act, SNL 1998, c P-7.1 [NLPPSA].
34. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(an). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “sale of goods 
without a change of possession”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ll). 
35. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ar)(ii)(D): “security interest” means…the interest of a buyer 
under a sale of goods without a change of possession, that does not secure payment or performance of 
an obligation; See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 
2(1)(pp)(ii)(D).
36. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 4(2): Subject to Sections 5 and 56, this Act applies to…a sale of goods 
without a change of possession, that does not secure payment or performance of an obligation; See 
also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 3(2)(d); NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 4(2)(d).
37. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ao). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “secured party”; 
NLPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(mm). 
38. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 26. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 25; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 
s 26.
39. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 20. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 19; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 
s 20. 
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security interest and gain optimal protection against C. Failure to effect 
valid registration leaves B vulnerable to a variety of competitors including 
buyers like C,40 lessees,41 secured parties42 and A’s trustee in bankruptcy.43
Even if B does effect valid registration, she remains vulnerable to C where, 
for example, C buys the goods from A as consumer goods for a purchase 
price of $1,000 or less.44 Under Model 3, where the initial sale from A to 
B occurs outside the ordinary course of business, and therefore constitutes 
a deemed security interest, the consequences are potentially dire if B fails 
to effect valid registration at the PPR. By reason of the NSPPSA’s cut-off 
rules, equally dire consequences may befall B even in cases where valid 
registration has been effected. 
c. “Seller in Possession” Exception to Nemo Dat
In contrast, where the initial sale from A to B occurs in the ordinary 
course of A’s business, the NSSGA applies to resolve the matter according 
to the traditional exception to nemo dat if C takes possession in good 
faith without notice of B’s interest.45 Model 3, like Model 1, affords B 
no formal registration-based protection against C in circumstances where 
the initial sale to B occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business. In such 
circumstances, B can only hope to somehow deliver actual notice of title 
to C so as to disqualify her from invoking the statutory exception to nemo 
dat. 
5. Hybrid Model: Yet More Variety
a. Model 4—Prince Edward Island
Canada’s lone Model 4 jurisdiction, Prince Edward Island, is a hybrid 
system that exhibits features of Models 2 and 3. Like Model 3, Model 
4 bifurcates the statutory analysis based on the nature of the initial sale 
transaction between A and B. 
40. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 31. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 30; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 
s 31.
41. Ibid.
42. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 36. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 35; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 
s 36.
43. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 21(2)(a). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 20(2)(a); NLPPSA, supra 
note 33, s 21(1)(a).
44. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 31(3) and (4). See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, ss 30(3) and (4); 
NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 31(3) and (4).
45. NSSGA, supra note 6, s 28(2); NBSGA, supra note 7, ss 31(2), (4); NB Factors Act, supra note 
10, ss 13(1) and (2); NLSGA, supra note 7, s 27(1). 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
????????????????????
b. Deemed PPSA Security Interest
If the sale from A to B occurs outside the ordinary course of A’s business, 
it constitutes a “sale of goods without a change of possession” within 
the meaning of Prince Edward Island’s Personal Property Security Act.46
Models 3 and 4 exhibit likeness in this respect. 
PEIPPSA, s. 1(nn): “sale of goods without a change of possession” means 
a sale of goods that is not accompanied by an immediate delivery and an 
actual, apparent and continued change of possession of the goods sold, 
but does not include a sale of goods in the ordinary course of business 
of the seller, and for the purpose of this de? nition, “sale” includes an 
assignment, transfer, conveyance, declaration of trust or any other 
agreement or transaction, not intended to secure payment or performance 
or an obligation, by which an interest in goods is conferred;47 
A sale of goods without a change of possession creates a deemed 
security interest48 under the PEIPPSA, thus making B a secured party.49
Accordingly, B must effect registration50 at the PPR to perfect his security 
interest.51 Under Model 4, failure to register leaves B’s interest unperfected 
and vulnerable to buyers and lessees,52 secured parties53 and A’s trustee in 
bankruptcy.54  
c. Resurrection of Nemo Dat
If the initial sale occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business, then 
pursuant to PEI Factors Act s. 9(2) B must register notice of his interest 
in the PPR if he wishes to preserve nemo dat and gain protection against 
third parties, like C, who deal with A in good faith outside the ordinary 
course of business. B is protected against C if he properly registers notice 
of his interest in the PPR;55 the exception to nemo dat in PEI Factors Act 
s. 9(1) no longer applies, and B prevails pursuant to the joint application 
of PEISGA s. 23 and PEI Factors Act s. 9(2).
PEI Factors Act, subsection 9(2): Subsection (1) does not apply to a 
sale, pledge or other disposition of goods or of documents of title to 
goods, other than negotiable documents of title to goods, that is out of 
46. Personal Property Security Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-3.1 [PEIPPSA].
47. Ibid, s 1(nn).
48. Ibid, ss 1(r)(ii)(D), 3(2)(d). 
49. Ibid, s 1(oo).
50. Ibid, s 25.
51. Ibid, s 19.
52. Ibid, s 30.
53. Ibid, s 35. 
54. Ibid, s 20(2)(a).
55. Personal Property Security Act Regulations, PEI Reg EC1998-270, ss 22-24.
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the ordinary course of business of the person having sold the goods 
where, prior to the sale, pledge or disposition, the interest of the owner 
is registered in the Personal Property Registry in accordance with the 
regulations made under the Personal Property Security Act and the said 
Act applies to such registration.56 
Like Model 2, Model 4 offers B effective registration-based protection 
against C as a subsequent non-ordinary course buyer. That protection, 
however, is not effective against a subsequent ordinary course 
buyer. Failure to effect valid registration leaves B vulnerable to a 
good faith non-ordinary course buyer who acquires the goods without 
notice of B’s interest.  
6. Recap
To brie? y recap, Model 1 fully adopts the Victorian era “seller in possession” 
exception to nemo dat and does not furnish, under any circumstances,
facilities for registration of B’s interest. In stark contrast, Model 2 is fully
integrated with the PPR’s electronic notice-registration system, furnishing
B with the option to register and protect her interest against subsequent
purchasers. Model 3 partially adopts the Victorian era exception where
the initial sale to B occurs in the ordinary course of A’s business. In such
a circumstance, Model 3 furnishes B with no statutory registration-based
protection. Meanwhile, if the initial sale takes place outside the ordinary
course of A’s business, Model 3 imposes a registration requirement on B
thereby exposing him to signi? cant risk of loss. Finally, Model 4 gives B
the option to register where the initial sale occurs in the ordinary course of
A’s business, but imposes a registration requirement on B where the initial
sale occurs outside the ordinary course.
II. Analysis
1. Model 1—Manitoba, Ontario, Yukon
One praiseworthy feature of Model 1 is that it does not expose B to undue
risk of loss to the trustee should A go bankrupt while in possession of the
subject goods. This point is signi? cant because, as a practical matter, it
is far more probable (at least one hopes, for the sake of humanity) that A
will (i) go bankrupt as an honest but unfortunate debtor than (ii) roguishly
resell B’s goods to C, an act that generally requires outright dishonesty or
extreme forgetfulness. In any case, B is not a secured party pursuant to
Model 1 personal property security legislation, and is therefore not at risk
of losing his title to the trustee in the event of A’s bankruptcy. Model 1
56. PEI Factors Act, supra note 10, s 9(2). 
????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ???
????????????????????
narrowly de? nes those eligible reliance parties—namely, innocent buyers 
(such as C), pledgees and disponees—who, in appropriate circumstances, 
may assert the “seller in possession” exception to nemo dat to defeat B’s 
title. Model 1 is well-tailored in this respect, unlike Models 3 and 4. 
Model 1 stands alone in offering B no formal registration-based 
protection against C under any circumstances. While this system may be 
lauded for its simplicity, one wonders why Model 1 legislators have chosen 
not to facilitate deferred-possession sales using personal property registry 
infrastructure designed precisely for the facilitation of non-possessory 
interests in personal property. Each Model 1 jurisdiction once had in force 
a Bills of Sale Act57 which has since been repealed.58 This means that where 
there was once a centralized registration system for protection of B’s title 
(however crude and inef? cient it may have been), there is now nothing. 
Model 1 can be criticized for not interacting with existing personal property 
registry infrastructure to facilitate sales in which deferred possession is 
part of a legitimate commercial arrangement.59 
It is ironic that, under Model 1, an unauthorized registration effected by 
a diligent and enterprising B—that is, a ? nancing statement, unsanctioned 
by any statutory regime, but nonetheless registered in the PPR by a 
buyer out of possession posing as a secured party—may ultimately prove 
successful in delivering notice of B’s ownership to C thereby defeating 
the statutory exception to nemo dat that C would otherwise enjoy. If C is 
a diligent buyer, she is likely to check the PPR for registered interests and 
in so doing will discover B’s unauthorized registration. At ? rst glance, 
this informal use of the PPR, and the unof? cial notice delivery system 
it creates, may not seem objectionable because, in the above scenario, C 
gains crucial knowledge that enables her to avoid a clash with B. In my 
view, however, Model 1 is de? cient because, if resort to the court system 
does become necessary, a judge must embark on a costly, and potentially 
protracted, fact-? nding mission to discover whether C actually knew of 
B’s ownership. This is precisely what Model 1’s personal property security 
legislation is designed to avoid. Under the OPPSA, where B is a secured 
party, it is the fact of B’s valid registration, not C’s knowledge thereof, 
that is dispositive of the matter. But where the “seller in possession” ABC 
57. Manitoba—The Bills of Sale Act, RSM 1954, c 17; Ontario—The Bills of Sale Act, RSO 1970, 
c 44; Yukon—Bills of Sale Ordinance, ROYT 1971, c B-1. 
58. Manitoba—An Act to Amend the Bills of Sale Act, SM 1973, c 7; Ontario—The Personal 
Property Security Act, 1989, SO 1989, c 16; Yukon—The Personal Property Security Ordinance, 
OYT 1980, c 20.
59. For cases illustrating deferred possession as a typical aspect of commercial arrangements see 
e.g.,  Bartin Pipe, supra note 13; Alberta Treasury Branches v Cam Holdings LP, 2016 ABQB 33. 
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problem presents itself and an enterprising B registers an unauthorized 
? nancing statement in the PPR claiming ownership of the goods, the 
situation is reversed in Ontario, and the title dispute is resolved under 
the OSGA according to the state of C’s actual knowledge. This statutory 
asymmetry is bothersome. 
As I have argued elsewhere, there is no convincing reason why sales 
legislation cannot and should not accommodate B as a buyer/owner to at 
least the same extent personal property security legislation accommodates 
her as a secured party.60 If a modern registration-based system facilitates 
secured transactions involving goods, protecting secured parties against 
subsequent competitors like C, then surely it should facilitate sales of 
those same goods on equally robust terms. 
2. Model 2—Alberta, British Columbia, Northwest Territories, Nunavut, 
Saskatchewan
Model 2 exposes B to risk of loss against only certain parties who advance 
value in reliance on A’s possession. Under Model 2, B is not at risk of 
losing his title to A’s trustee in bankruptcy or, for example, a subsequent 
non-possessory secured party. Like Model 1, Model 2 is well-tailored in 
this respect. 
By offering B formal, yet attenuated, registration-based protection in 
the case of a deferred-possession sale, Model 2 addresses the de? ciency 
in Model 1. B may effect registration at the PPR and in so doing deprive 
a non-ordinary course buyer, C, of the statutory exception to nemo dat 
to which he would otherwise be entitled. Under Model 2, B receives 
statutory protection roughly equivalent to that he would receive were 
he a non-possessory secured party governed by the PPSA.61 One must 
emphasize, however, that under Model 2, registration is a mere option, not 
a requirement. A diligent buyer without possession may avail himself of 
this registration option in appropriate circumstances. However, his failure 
to effect a valid registration (including if he simply chooses not to register) 
does not necessarily place him at undue risk of loss, and still leaves him 
with nemo dat as a fallback position. In my view, this characteristic of 
Model 2 makes it markedly superior to Models 3 and 4.  
3. Model 3—New Brunswick, Newfoundland & Labrador, Nova Scotia
Model 3 exposes B to material risk of loss against a variety of competitors 
in an array of arguably unwarranted circumstances. To appreciate this risk, 
one must ? rst understand an extremely complicated statutory system. My 
60. Bangsund, supra note 2 at 155.
61. Ibid at 149.  
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then regardless of the nature of the initial transaction, B should be entitled 
to registration-based protection. 
It is important to note that Model 3 personal property security 
legislation characterizes all buyers who enter into a sale of goods without 
a change of possession, not merely a special class of them, as deemed 
secured parties bound by the PPSA’s registration requirements. This is 
problematic since deemed secured parties under the NSPPSA are typically 
specialized, highly sophisticated parties who regularly engage with the 
PPR and its statutory trappings, and therefore can reasonably be expected 
to understand the technical legal system within which they operate. 
Examples include commercial consignors,63 leasing companies,64 accounts 
factors65 and chattel paper ? nanciers.66 In juxtaposition, buyers represent 
a far more generalized class. Under Model 3, all buyers—multinational 
corporations, lawyers, retired teachers, unemployed musicians, etc.—
are subject to the strict registration requirements of the NSPPSA and the 
severe consequences that attend failure to register.67 Indeed, where the sale 
from A to B happens to occur outside the ordinary course of A’s business, 
Model 3 has the potential to impose a harsh outcome on an unwitting B. 
Model 3 incentivizes A’s trustee in bankruptcy to challenge the 
ownership of any person whose purchased property is left in A’s possession 
at the time of bankruptcy. If successful, the trustee in bankruptcy may 
claim the goods for the bene? t of the bankrupt estate and its general 
creditors. For example, a trustee in bankruptcy might argue that what 
may have initially appeared to be an ordinary course sale from A to B in 
fact constituted a sale outside the ordinary course of A’s business, thereby 
triggering the NSPPSA’s registration requirement, which invariably will 
be unsatis? ed in such circumstances. The dearth of case law on this point 
is surprising.68 In any case, I can think of no compelling reason why a 
63. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(h), “commercial consignment” and 2(1)(ar)(ii)(A), “security 
interest”. See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “commercial consignment” and “security interest”; 
NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(h), 2(1)(pp)(2)(A).
64. NSPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(y), “lease for a term of more than one year,” and 2(1)(ar)(ii)(B), 
“security interest.” See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, s 1(1), “lease for a term of more than one year,” 
“security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, ss 2(1)(y), 2(1)(pp)(2)(B).
65. NSPPSA, supra note 33, s 2(1)(ar)(ii)(C), “security interest.” See also NBPPSA, supra note 33, 
s 1(1)(b)(iii), “security interest”; NLPPSA, supra note 33, 2(1)(pp)(2)(C), “security interest.”
66. Ibid.
67. Anecdotally, just in the last year alone I can recall at least three instances in which I have 
purchased goods and temporarily left them in the sellers’ possession. On each occasion I accepted the 
risks associated with not registering under Saskatchewan law, but that is only because the stakes were 
quite low. Had I been making larger purchases of, say, mining equipment, a crane or a drilling rig, I 
de? nitely would have availed myself of the SSGA’s optional registration-based protection.
68. A recent case law search reveals that the term “sale of goods without a change of possession” has 
never received any substantive consideration by a court. 
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trustee in bankruptcy should be in a position to negate B’s ownership of 
the goods. A’s unsecured creditors cannot nullify B’s ownership of the 
goods prior to A’s bankruptcy, so there is no logical basis to confer such an 
extraordinary power on the trustee in bankruptcy. 
While intricate (aesthetically appealing, from a law professor’s 
perspective) and internally coherent, Model 3 is needlessly complex and 
imposes excessive risk on buyers out of possession in too broad an array 
of circumstances. In other barely distinguishable circumstances, Model 3 
does not offer formal registration-based protection to B, instead resolving 
the matter exclusively with reference to a statutory provision drafted in 
England in the late nineteenth century.  
4.? Model 4—Prince Edward Island
An evaluation of Prince Edward Island’s regime yields mixed results given 
the hybrid nature of Model 4. Where the initial sale from A to B occurs 
in the ordinary course of A’s business, Model 4 offers B sensible, though 
attenuated, registration-based protection against C. To this extent, Model 
4 can be commended on the same grounds as Model 2. 
However, where the initial sale from A to B occurs outside the 
ordinary course of A’s business, Model 4 exhibits the same ? aws as Model 
3, imposing harsh consequences on B if she fails to effect registration in 
relation to her deemed security interest. While Model 4 can be commended 
for offering B registration-based protection in all circumstances, this 
strength is offset by its partial adoption of the Model 3 system. 
Conclusion
The “seller in possession” ABC problem presents an interesting example 
of diversity in Canadian sales law. Some jurisdictions have opted to 
incorporate modernized electronic PPR infrastructure (designed for 
registration of notice of non-possessory interests in personal property) 
into their statutory priority governance structures for resolution of the 
problem, while other jurisdictions have not. Some have gone the full 
distance and brought such transactions under PPSA governance, while 
other jurisdictions have refrained from going that far. In my view, for the 
reasons given above, Model 2 jurisdictions most appropriately de? ne B’s 
risk exposure while offering reasonable facilities for the protection of his 
or her non-possessory ownership interest. In my view, Model 2 is most 
consonant with and responsive to legitimate commercial expectations and 
needs. Model 2 best balances the competing interests at stake and furnishes 
buyers with registration-based protection should they ever ? nd themselves 
unable to take immediate possession of bought goods. 
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I will close with some words of wisdom for buyers across common 
law Canada. One who buys goods without taking possession thereof 
places himself at risk—in some circumstances, signi? cant risk—of loss of 
the proprietary claim. In jurisdictions where registration-based protection 
is permissible or mandatory, B should register notice of ownership in the 
PPR to gain optimal protection against third party competitors. Failure to 
register may prove fatal to the proprietary claim. Even in those jurisdictions 
where registration is not statutorily sanctioned, B should consider 
registering as a means of delivering notice to C. Finally, in addition to 
whatever registration-based protection is available under the applicable 
statutory scheme, B should ensure, where possible, that a mark or tag is 
fastened to goods left in A’s possession, thereby placing any prospective 
buyer, C, on notice of B’s ownership interest and defeating his claim to 
a ?????????exception. Sometimes the best technology is old technology.
